India's Strategic Shift: Navigating the Complexities of US-China Relations

The Indo-Pacific Strategy and India's Role

In February 2018, the Trump administration outlined the 'US strategic framework for the Indo-Pacific', which was later declassified in January 2021. This document articulated America's goal to maintain its strategic dominance while curbing China's influence in the region. It emphasized that China's ascent would alter the regional dynamics and challenge US authority globally, positing that a robust India, in alliance with like-minded nations, could serve as a counterbalance to China. The US aimed to establish itself as 'India's preferred partner on security matters', fostering cooperation to ensure maritime security and counteract China's reach. The envisioned 'Quad' framework would integrate the naval forces of India, Japan, Australia, and the US as primary counterweights against China. This strategy positioned India as a 'Major Defense Partner', facilitating collaboration to thwart China's military advancements.

However, the rationale behind India's alignment with this strategy remains ambiguous. There was no parliamentary debate, media interviews, or public announcements regarding this shift. Prime Minister Modi began steering India towards this military alliance with the US without clear communication. Notably, during Trump's visit to India in February 2020, just before the Ladakh crisis erupted, Modi reaffirmed India's commitment to this agreement against China.

On October 27, 2020, during US Defense Secretary Mike Pompeo's visit, India ratified the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), enhancing its access to American intelligence to refine the accuracy of its missile systems and drones. This agreement hinted at potential air force collaboration. Additionally, the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) was signed, allowing the two nations' militaries to utilize each other's bases for supplies and services, thereby facilitating navy-to-navy cooperation. While signing BECA, Pompeo directly criticized China, stating that the US and India were strengthening their cooperation against various threats, particularly those posed by the Chinese Communist Party.

Secretary of State Mike Esper emphasized the US's commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, especially in light of China's increasing aggression. Although Rajnath Singh and Jaishankar stood alongside Pompeo and Esper, they refrained from naming China explicitly. Singh's original remarks included a reference to 'reckless aggression on our northern borders', which was later omitted from the official transcript. When the US document was declassified, China accused the US of forming alliances and engaging in divisive tactics that undermine regional stability. India did not publicly respond to the document's release.

A third agreement, the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), was signed six months after the US outlined its strategy, allowing India access to encrypted communication systems for secure military coordination. Together, BECA, LEMOA, and COMCASA form a trio of foundational agreements for deep military collaboration between the US and India. COMCASA was finalized in September 2018, shortly after Modi's meeting with Xi in Wuhan, where they agreed to foster cooperation rather than rivalry and enhance bilateral trade.

The contradiction in Modi's approach is evident; while engaging with Xi, he simultaneously aligned with Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy. China's response involved escalating tensions at the Ladakh border, diverting India's military focus from maritime to land issues. Former national security advisor MK Narayanan cautioned Modi against positioning India as a frontline member of a coalition against China, emphasizing the importance of neutrality in border agreements. He referenced the 2005 agreement that outlined the guiding principles for resolving the India-China boundary dispute, highlighting the historical context of these discussions.

The relevance of past agreements is underscored by current events, illustrating India's precarious position today—confused and isolated. The current government's actions appear to be dismantling the agreements established in 1993 and beyond, inadvertently granting China more space and options. There seems to be a lack of understanding regarding the significance of the treaties, both formal and informal, that India has entered into.